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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that respondent's
burn occurred within the "quasi-course of employment" is incorrect.

Activities which come within the "quasi-course of employ-

ment " are activities that would not have been undertaken but for
the compensable injury.

A common example would be trips to the

doctor for treatment.

The respondent sustained the burns in

question while he was working on his car, repairing a heater or
cooking his meals, none of which, obviously, was necessitated by
his industrial accident.

Therefore, according to Professor

Larson, because the injuries were not sustained in the "quasicourse of employment11, they should be compensable only if the
chain of causation leading from the industrial injury to the
burn injury had not been broken by the injured employee's negligence.

Simple common sense tells us that the respondent had to

know he had no feeling in his right hand and fingers.
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Moreover,

the respondent testified at the evidentiary hearing that he knew
of the loss of feeling in his hand.

He was, therefore, negligent

t£S ie&3 locguitur in working around extremely hot equipment and
surfaces without taking any protective measures.

This negligence

broke the chain of causation leading from the industrial accident
to the burn injuries; therefore those injuries are not compensable.

AfiCTMENT
POINT I.
THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE RESPONDENT WAS
NOT SUSTAINED IN THE "QUASI-COURSE OP EMPLOYMENT".
The respondent did not sustain the burn injuries with which
we are here concerned while he was in the quasi-course of his
employment,

"Quasi-course of employment" is a theory developed by

Professor Larson.

Larson defines quasi-course of employment as

follows:
Activities undertaken by the employee following his injury which, although they take place
outside the time and space limits of employment f would not be considered employment
activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to employment in the sense that
they are necessary, reasonable activities that

would not have been undertaken but for the
compensable injury,
13.11(d).

Larson, Vol. I, Section

The Administrative Law Judge and the respondent completely ignore
the language "that would not have been undertaken but for the
compensable injury."

Both misquote Larson as including activities

which are merely "necessary and reasonable."

They go on to point

2
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out that cooking is a necessary and reasonable activity*

This is

not the standard to be applied when determining if an injury is
sustained during the quasi-course of employment and should,
therefore, be compensable.
The correct standard

as described by Professor Larson

requires that the activity be one that is necessitated by the
industrial accident*

As pointed out in appellant's brief, this

includes such things as trips to the doctor to have the injury
examined or treated.

It clearly does not include working on cars,

replacing heaters, or cooking.

No stretch of the imagination

could bring those activities into Larson's definition.

The

respondent's current injuries did not occur while he was engaged
in the "quasi-course of employment", and, therefore, they are not
compensable, irregardless of negligence, under this theory.

POINT II
THE CHAIN OP CAUSATION PROM THE PRIMARY
INDUSTRIAL INJURY TO THE CURRENT INJURIES WAS
BROKEN BY THE APPLICANT'S NEGLIGENCE.
Because the respondent did not incur his injuries during a
quasi-course of employment activity, those injuries should not
be compensable due to the fact that the applicant's negligent
conduct caused the injuries.
Respondent states that Sullivan v. B & A Construction,

Inc..

122 N.Y.S.2d 571, Rev'g. 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954), is
inapplicable to the instant case (Respondent's brief, p. 5 ) . It
is difficult to see how a case could be much more applicable.

In

Sullivan. an industrial injury caused the applicant's knee to
3
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occasionally lock.

Despite the fact that his knee tended to

lock and despite the fact that he knew it tended to lock, the
applicant continued to drive his car.

While driving his automo-

bile one day, the applicant's knee locked in such a manner as to
deprive him of the use of his right leg.

This resulted in an

automobile accident wherein the applicant was injured.

The Court

denied compensation for those injuries on the basis that the
applicant's own negligence, not the industrial injury, caused the
accident.
In the instant case, though the respondent had no feeling in
his hand and knew he had no feeling in his hand, he proceeded to
work around and with hot objects.

It was the applicant's negli-

gence in working around hot objects and not the industrial injury
which caused the burns to his hand.
Completely ignoring the facts of the case, the respondent
states, "Mr. McKean had no prior knowledge as to the loss of
feeling or use in his arm and hand" (Respondent's brief, p. 6 ) .
This denies not only common sense, but the facts as they were
testified to in the administrative hearing.

At the administrative

hearing, the respondent testified that he knew that his hand and
arm were numb:
Q. Now you testified that from the time of
your injury your right arm had been somewhat
numb; is that true?
A. Well, I ain't had—there ain't no feeling
in half of my hand. There's a little bit of
feeling in the other half.
Q.

So is it fair to say that from your elbow
4
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to your thumb on that portion of your arm you
are numb?
A. Pretty much from the incision where my arm
got cut off to my thumb. That way I ain't got
no sensation or feeling.
Q. And you obviously were aware of that from
the date of your accident?
A. Not really. I knew there was some but I
didn't know to what extent. I didn't know
howr or anything much about it. Cause see
when I moved to Idaho I'd just got it back on
and it was just beginning to grow back and day
by day this side of my hand here was getting a
little bit more feeling in it further up.
Q. But you obviously knew you had sensation
problems and didn't have good touch like in
your left hand; is that true?
A.

Yeah.

0hf yeah.

Definitely.

Q. And you obviously had trouble holding onto
things with your right hand?
A. I couldn't even use my right hand at all.
Couldn't hold nothing. I can't hold onto
nothing unless I put it in there with my left
hand.
(R. 67-68) .
his hand.
know.

The respondent obviously knew he had no feeling in
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how he could not

Both the respondent and the Administrative Law Judge make

much of the fact that respondent's doctor told respondent that the
feeling would return to his hand.
irrelevant.

This evidence is completely

If a scar does not disappear, no patient would

reasonably believe the scar was gone just because the doctor said
it would disappear.
be ignored.

Therefore, the optimism of the doctor should

The fact of the matter is the respondent's hand was

5
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numb at the time of the burn*

On direct examination the respon-

dent testified:
Q. Now the nature of those operations—What
did they do to—Did they limit your sensation
into your hand at all?
A. Well, see, ever since I lost my armr I
ain f t had no feelings* I didn't have no
feeling in my hand, I think it was just last
year they had to go in my leg and cut a nerve
out of my leg and put in my arm, just to get
some of the feeling back in parts of my arm.
Q. You did not have that nerve in your arm,
though, at the time of the burn?
A. I don't think so* I—Even if I did, it
takes months for it to grow a centimeter or an
inch, so it would of took a year anyways, even
if I would have had it in there for it to grow
(inaudible portion) out here to where I can
feel it* And that's if it would of took.
Like right now after they put it in, I still
don't got no feeling sensation in my thumb.
All that's there is like when your foot goes
to sleep, it tingles.
(R. 45, 46) .

I t i s not clear whether the Administrative Law Judge found
t h a t the applicant was not negligent.

In his Findings of Pact,

the Judge t a l k s about the "reasonableness" of the respondent's
activities.

He uses the terms "reasonable" and "necessary" when

d i s c u s s i n g both the q u a s i - c o u r s e of employment i s s u e and the
negligence i s s u e .
negligence.

Judge Allen never analyzes the elements of

If the Findings and Conclusions can somehow be

construed as finding that the respondent was not negligent, the
findings are without support in the record and the Industrial
Commission acted in excess of i t s powers in affirming that order.
The evidence clearly establishes that respondent knew he suffered
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a loss of feeling in his hand and, nevertheless, worked around
extremely hot equipment and surfaces without taking any measures
to protect his numb right hand.

This was undeniably negligent on

his part.

CONCLUSION
The only reasonable interpretation of Judge Allen's failure
to discuss negligence is that he based his Order on the erroneous
conclusion that respondent was engaged in a "quasi-course of
employment" activity when he suffered the burns to his right
hand.

Quasi-course of employment activities are activities

necessitated by the industrial accident.

Clearly, neither working

on a car, repairing a heater, or cooking is necessitated by an
industrial accident.

The respondent was not engaged in quasi-

course of employment activities when he was burned; therefore
those burns are not compensable, if caused by his own negligence.
Based on the record, the respondent was negligent res ipsa
locquitur«

If Judge Allen's Findings and Conclusion can somehow

be construed as finding that the respondent was not negligent,
that finding is completely without support in the record.
Accordingly, appellant's

requests that the Industrial

Commission's Denial of Motion for Review ordering compensation for
respondent's burn injury should be reversed.
Finally, to allow Judge Allen's decision to stand would
unwisely extend workmen's compensation insurance benefits to a
class of injuries not reasonably related to the original compensable accident.

Judge Allen's decision, in this regard, has
7
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far-reaching impact on employers and insurance carriers alike.

If

not reversedf the ruling could effectively transform workmenfs
compensation into broad line health insurance.

This result is not

consistent with the legislative intent or historical purpose of
workmen's compensation*

If such changes are needed, they should

not be effected by the judiciary, but, rather, by legislative
enactment•
DATED this

/A_

z%

day of June, 1985.
BLACK/& MOORE

Q ^ ^ - u ^ _ -Q, .„=£,

-c3—<

Dennis V. Lloyd
In-House Legal Counsel
State Insurance Fund
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIEQ
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and exact copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this

-£•

K.
day of June,

1985, to the following:
Stephen Schwendiman
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Mary C. Corporon
Chris D. Nichols
Boston Bldg., Suite 1100
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

'-^iiclM^/'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

